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MIKE ZIMMER, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AND "A GIFT
THAT KEEPS GIVING"
BY
WILLIAM R. CORBETT*
"And with that, I am done with McDonnell Douglas on its 40th
birthday."
"No, Bill. McDonnell Douglas is a gift that keeps giving. We both have
made a careerout of it and I expect we can continue digging up new angles. "'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mike Zimmer saw a way to achieve coherence, clarity, and
symmetry in employment discrimination law even as the courts
decided cases that increasingly made the law appear incoherent and
chaotic. Mike could take the very decisions that were making
discrimination law more asymmetrical and inscrutable and use them
to weave together a holistic and sensible model. In no area was his
gift more apparent than in individual disparate treatment law,
particularly in attempting to impose some order on that unruly beast,
the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis.2 If the courts had followed
the course charted by Mike in his articles, employment discrimination
law would be far better today. Perhaps either the courts or Congress
or both still can and will. Mike was an optimist, and he would believe
that today. Missing my friend, I shall pay homage to his vision for
individual disparate treatment law, and in doing so, believe that
Mike's vision is still achievable.
II. A RELATIONSHIP WITH MIKE ZIMMER - A GIFT THAT KEEPS
GIVING

Over a period of about two decades, Mike and I wrote many
articles about proof of disparate treatment discrimination, often
focusing on McDonnell Douglas. I so revered Mike and valued his
opinion and advice that I almost never submitted an article for
consideration by journals without first sending him a draft and getting
his feedback. Mike Zimmer was my friend, mentor, role model, and
advisor. Since I have known him, I have wanted to "be like Mike." 3
My relationship with Mike began in January 1995 at a conference
at Stetson University College of Law - the Tenth Annual National
2. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
3. Twenty-five years ago one of the best known commercials in television's history
debuted. It was a Gatorade commercial featuring NBA legend Michael Jordan. See Darren
Rovell, Famed "Be Like Mike" Gatorade Ad Debuted 25 Years Ago, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2016),
<http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/17246999/michael-jordan-famous-mike-gatorade-commer
cial-debuted-25-years-ago-Monday>.
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Conference on Labor and Employment Law. At that time, Mike had
been a professor and brilliant employment discrimination scholar for
many years. I, on the other hand, had been teaching for just over
three years, and I had neither published an article about employment
discrimination law nor taught the course. At the conference Mike
presented a paper on the uniform analysis of individual disparate
treatment cases that he posited should emerge from the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. My paper was about the after-acquired evidence rule,
which was the subject of a case then pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court.4 Mike's paper was far more ambitious and better than mine.
His paper was the precursor to what I consider one of his best articles:
The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment
Discrimination Litigation, which he published in a 1996 employment
discrimination law symposium of the Georgia Law Review. As fate
would have it, my Stetson conference paper was the precursor to an
article that I published in the same symposium issue. 6 Mike was kind
enough to give me helpful feedback on my paper after the Stetson
conference, and with his help, I improved the paper and managed to
have it included in an outstanding symposium issue that included the
work of Mike, Rebecca Hanner White, Ann Hodges, and Susan
Grover.' That pattern of Mike teaching me and helping me with
scholarship would continue for two decades. I never stopped asking
for his help, and he never stopped giving it.
When I first taught Employment Discrimination law in 1996,
naturally I used the wonderful case book by Mike and his co-authors
(currently Charlie Sullivan and Rebecca White),' and I still use it. By
using it to teach my course, I have continued to learn about
employment discrimination law through the work of Mike and his coauthors.
Around 2005, Mike invited some distinguished comparative
labor law scholars and me to work on an international and
comparative labor law case book. 9 Although I was out of my league
4. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
5. 30 GA. L. REV. 563 (1996).
6. William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, the Rise of "Pretext Plus," and the
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will:
Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996).
7. That symposium afforded me my first correspondence with Professor and future Dean
Rebecca White, who has been a friend and mentor ever since.
8. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (8th ed. 2012).

9.

ROGER

BLANPAIN

ET

AL.,

THE

GLOBAL

WORKPLACE:

INTERNATIONAL

AND
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working on such a project with Mike, Roger Blanpain, Susan BisomRapp, and Hilary K. Josephs, they were patient with me, and the
project greatly expanded my knowledge of and perspective on labor
and employment law.
From the time I first met Mike Zimmer until the last year of his
life, I benefited from the friendship and mentorship of a brilliant,
generous, and kind person. A relationship with Mike truly was a gift
that keeps giving - even after his passing.
III. MIKE ZIMMER'S SCHOLARSHIP: THE GIFT OF SEEKING TO
CREATE ORDER FROM CHAOS (OR LEMONADE FROM LEMONS)

I am a pessimist. Mike was an optimist. Our scholarship on
disparate treatment law reflects this difference. With the rendering of
most of the Supreme Court's decisions on disparate treatment and the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, I became more disillusioned. Mike, on
the other hand, could take each decision and the progression of
decisions and craft a positive vision for development of the law.o He
took each decision and development and laid out a plan for how each
could be used to create a uniform and sensible body of law. The
courts often did not follow that plan. But, channeling Mike, I will say
now that the hope remains. Mike envisioned individual disparate
treatment law as it should be, and that vision is worth pursuing.
A. Brief Chronology of the Development of Individual Disparate
Treatment Law
Much of the development of the federal employment
discrimination laws in the courts, and many of the Supreme Court's
employment discrimination opinions have focused on the proof
structures used to analyze individual disparate treatment claims." The
COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW - CASES AND MATERIALS
(1st ed. CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS 2007).

(2d ed. Wolters Kluwer 2012)

10. See Jason R. Bent, Hope for Zimmerism: Overcoming the Empathy Problem in
AntidiscriminationLaw, 20 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL'Y J. 277 (2016).
11. The Court recently reiterated its well-known nutshell on theories of discrimination in
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). The Court explained that disparate
treatment is "a claim that an employer intentionally treat[s] a complainant less favorably than
employees with the 'complainant's qualifications' but outside the complainant's protected
class." Id. at 1345. The Court also explained two other theories of discrimination - disparate
impact, based on discriminatory effects of a facially neutral employment practice in which intent
or motive is not required, and "pattern-or-practice" (also known as systemic disparate
treatment), based on proof of intentional discrimination as the employer's standard operating

procedure. See also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
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Supreme Court created two proof frameworks to analyze individual
disparate treatment employment discrimination claims. The Court
announced the pretext framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green1 2 in 1973 and the mixed-motives structure in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkinsl3 in 1989. Although both were created by the Court,
mixed-motives later would be modified and codified by Congress in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.14
The McDonnell Douglas pretext framework is a three-part proof
structure with shifting burdens of production. A plaintiff bears the
initial burden of production to establish a prima facie case by proving
1) that he belongs to a protected class, 2) that he applied and was
qualified for the job, 3) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected,
and 4) that the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants having the plaintiff's qualifications." The Court
noted in McDonnell Douglas that the elements of the prima facie case
will vary with different factual situations.16 If the plaintiff satisfies the
burden of the prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant-employer to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions.1 7 Finally, if the employer satisfies its burden at
the second stage, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff
to prove that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for
discrimination.
The McDonnell Douglas opinion announced the proof structure,
but the mechanics and meaning of the analysis were not fully
developed at that time. The Court found it necessary to explain the
meaning and procedural effect of the second and third stages of the
analysis in several subsequent cases. These decisions include Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,19 St. Mary' s Honor
Center v. Hicks,20 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 21

(explaining the differences between disparate treatment and disparate impact).
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
13. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
14. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012)).
15. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
16. Id. at 802 n.13.
17. Id. at 802-03.
18. Id. at 804.
19. 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (explaining the defendant's burden at stage two).
20. 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (explaining the effect of proof of pretext in a fully tried case).
21. 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (explaining the effect of proof of pretext at summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law).
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The decisions helped to clarify the standards and burdens of proof
under the pretext framework, but even these decisions did not make
the pretext framework easily applicable in all employment
discrimination cases.
The Supreme Court never has held that the pretext analysis is
applicable to analyze ADEA cases (although it assumed it in
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.22 ), and lower courts
routinely have applied it. The Court seems implicitly to have
approved the applicability of the pretext analysis to disability
discrimination claims under the ADA in Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez.2 3
The court announced the alternative proof structure, mixed
motives, in Price Waterhouse. The plurality opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence applied different standards to the plaintiff's
prima facie case - "motivating factor" applied by the plurality,24 and
"substantial factor" by the concurrence. 25 After Price Waterhouse,
most courts applied substantial factor. The second stage of the
analysis was an affirmative defense under which a defendant could
avoid liability by proving that it would have taken the same action for
a nondiscriminatory reason (the same-decision defense).26 Courts also
grappled with the issue of under which proof structure any particular
case should be analyzed. Most circuits seized upon the dividing line
cited by the O'Connor concurrence: cases in which there was direct
evidence were analyzed under mixed-motives, and circumstantial
evidence cases were analyzed under pretext. 27 The courts of appeals
developed various definitions to distinguish direct from circumstantial
evidence. 28 The tests were confusing and uncertain - described by a
court that sought to put an end to the distinction as "chaos" and a

"morass."29
22. 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) ("In assessing claims of age discrimination brought under the
ADEA, the Fourth Circuit, like others, has applied some variant of the basic evidentiary
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. We have never had occasion to decide whether that
application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not
contest that point, we shall assume it.").
23. 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
24. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989).
25. Id. at 274 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 244-45 (plurality opinion).
27. Id. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Charles A.
Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV.
191, 210 n.81 (2009) (collecting court decisions and articles).
29. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 299 F.3d 838, 851-53 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539
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Congress made some changes in at least one disparate treatment
proof structure in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Given the splintered
Court decision in Price Waterhouse, Congress clarified and fixed the
mixed-motives proof structure. Congress codified "motivating factor"
as the causation standard in the plaintiff's prima face case rather than
"substantial factor." 3 0 Congress also changed the analysis of Price
Waterhouse by providing that the same-decision defense is not a
complete defense, avoiding liability. Instead, liability is still imposed
even if the employer satisfies its burden on the same-decision
defense, but the defense limits the remedies that are available.31
The mixed-motives framework was developed in Price
Waterhouse, a Title VII sex discrimination case. Courts assumed that
it also applied to the ADEA32 and the ADA,33 although most thought
that the Price Waterhouse version was applicable under those statutes
because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not amend the ADEA and
the ADA to install the modified statutory version of mixed motives. 34
As long as courts maintained a dividing line between cases to be
analyzed under pretext and those to be analyzed under mixed
motives, it was reasonable for courts to continue using the two proof
structures and the rich body of case law developed under them.
However, the Supreme Court called into question this dichotomy
when it held in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa that direct evidence is not
required for a plaintiff to be entitled to a motivating factor jury
instruction.35 With that, the Court seemingly erased the generally
accepted line separating the cases analyzed under pretext and those
analyzed under mixed motives. The Court based its holding on the
fact that the language added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not
say anything about "motivating factor" being limited to direct
evidence cases. Even Justice O'Connor, on whose Price Waterhouse
concurrence the distinction was based, agreed that the 1991 Act had
U.S. 90 (2003).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
31. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The limitation is significant, leaving the plaintiff with no money.
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co, Inc., 364 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2004); Rose v.
N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001).
33. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 959 (7th Cir. 2010)
(collecting cases).
34. See, e.g., Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 512 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004)
("Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to ADEA cases ... we continue to apply
the Price Waterhouse test in order to resolve ADEA cases."); Parker v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 336-37 (2d Cir. 2000) (collecting ADA cases applying Price Waterhouse
methodology).
35. 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).
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eviscerated the distinction. 36 Did elimination of the dividing line mean
that all individual disparate treatment cases were to be analyzed
31
under the mixed-motives framework? The Court declined to say.
The lower courts were left with no guidance on deciding what to do
with the two disparate treatment proof structures - the McDonnell
Douglas pretext framework and the statutory mixed-motives analysis.
Desert Palace appeared to be a landmark development in the
evolution of the proof frameworks for one thing that it expressly did
and one thing that it could be read as implicitly doing. First, it
expressly ended the division and analysis of employment
discrimination claims based on the type of evidence (direct or
circumstantial) on which they were based. This was a good
development in employment discrimination law because the dividing
line had proven to be chimerical. Second, Desert Palace could be read
as inferentially displacing the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis
and leaving all individual disparate treatment claims to be analyzed
under the statutory mixed-motives framework. Because Desert Palace
did not establish a clear new basis of demarcation between cases to be
analyzed under the two proof frameworks, some courts38 and
commentators3 9 suggested or argued that the McDonnell Douglas
framework was dead. Those arguments notwithstanding, the courts
continued to use the pretext analysis, with most never mentioning
that Desert Palace had erased the dividing line and thereby called into
question the continuing viability of McDonnell Douglas. Moreover,
many courts continued to refer to the pretext analysis as being for
cases based on circumstantial evidence and the mixed-motives
analysis for cases based on direct evidence, saying that when a
plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence the case must be
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas analysis.40 Although it
certainly was arguable that the pretext analysis survived Desert
Palace, the courts that insisted upon maintaining the direct36. Id. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. In fact the Court said it would not say: "This case does not require us to decide when, if
ever, §107 applies outside of the mixed-motives context." Id. at 94 n.1 (majority opinion).
38. See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990-93 (D. Minn. 2003).
39. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83 (2004); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est
Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the
Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "MixedMotives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 (2003); Kaitlin Picco, The Mixed-Motive Mess:
Defining and Applying a Mixed Motive Framework, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461 (2011).
40. See, e.g., Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 475 (5th
Cir. 2015); Marable v. Marion Military Inst., 595 F. App'x. 921 (1lth Cir. 2014).
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circumstantial evidence dividing line were flouting the Court's
decision in Desert Palace.
In Gross v. FBL FinancialServices,41 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the issue whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence
of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives instruction in a
non-Title VII discrimination case.42 However, the Court majority, in a
5-4 decision, stated that it had to decide a preliminary issue before
reaching the one on which certiorari was granted: whether the burden
of persuasion ever shifts to the defendant in an ADEA case. 43 That is,
the Court addressed the question of whether the mixed-motives
analysis applies to claims under the ADEA. The majority rejected the
plaintiff's reliance on decisions interpreting Title VII as controlling.
The Court explained that it never had held that the mixed-motives
analysis of Price Waterhouse applies to the ADEA.44 When Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it amended Title VII to add the
mixed-motives analysis, but it did not amend the ADEA similarly.45
Thus, with the 1991 Act, Congress created a "materially different"
burden of persuasion in Title VII than exists in the ADEA:
"motivating factor" in Title VII and "because of" in the ADEA.46 The
Court therefore concluded that its interpretation of the ADEA was
not controlled by decisions interpreting Title VII - specifically Price
Waterhouse and Desert Palace.
Having dispatched with the authority of Price Waterhouse and
Desert Palace, the Court majority shifted to interpreting the text of
the ADEA. The Court read the "because of . . age" language to
mean that age must be the but-for cause of the employer's action. 47
The Court explained this interpretation of "because of" based on
dictionary definitions, its opinion in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,48 a
couple
of
non-employment-discrimination
Court
decisions
interpreting the similar language "by reason of" and "based on," and
a torts treatise explaining but-for causation. 49 From these sources, the
41. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. at 167 (2009)
(No. 08-441), 2008 WL 4462099.
43. Gross, 557 U.S. at 173.
44. Id. at 174.
45. Id.
46. Id. ("Unlike Title VII the ADEA's text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish
discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor.").
47. Id. at 176-77.
48. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
49. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176-78.

312

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 20:303

-

Court gleaned that the "ordinary" meaning of the statutory language
"because of" is but-for causation.o
After concluding that the standard of causation is but-for, the
Court turned to the burden of persuasion. The Court stated that the
default rule is that plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion, and the
text of the ADEA indicates no exception to that default rule.
Locking in a uniform analysis for intentional age discrimination cases,
the Court stated that the burden of persuasion is the same in mixedmotives cases as in other individual disparate treatment cases: the
plaintiff must prove that age is the but-for cause of the employer's
decision.
In 2013, the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Gross
decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar.53 In Nassar the Court held that because the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII (section 704(a)) 54 Uses "because of" and was not
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the standard of causation is
but-for, and the mixed-motives analysis is not applicable to claims
under the anti-retaliation provision.
So where are we in the law of individual disparate treatment at
the end of this progression? There appear to be two analyses or proof
frameworks applicable under Title VII's anti-discrimination
provision, but no one really knows how to discern which one is
applicable to any given case. There are two sections in the
antidiscrimination provision, section 703, that state what may be
different standards of causation (or motivation or something)
section 703(a) "because of" and section 703(m) "motivating factor."
No one knows if they truly are two different standards, 56 and if they
are, how one decides which is applicable to any given case.
Asymmetrically, the ADEA and the anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII, section 704(a), have only the language "because of," which
means but-for causation and precludes the applicability of the mixed50. Id.
51. Id. at 177.
52. Id. at 177-78.
53. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
55. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533.
56. The Supreme Court commented on the relationship between the two sections in EEOC
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). The Court stated that although
"because of" means, "at a minimum, the traditional standard of but-for causation ... Title VII
relaxes this standard ... to prohibit even making a protected characteristic a 'motivating factor'
in an employment decision." Id. at 2032.
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motives analysis. Most courts and lawyers think that the McDonnell
Douglas pretext analysis applies to claims under the ADEA and Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision, but the Supreme Court has reserved
judgment on that issue regarding the ADEA17 and has not commentd
on it in the context of anti-retaliation. The law applicable to the ADA
probably is the same that is applicable to the ADEA and Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision, meaning but-for causation, but that is far
from certain."
B. Mike Zimmer's Vision - A Uniform Analysis for Individual
Disparate Treatment Claims Under All FederalEmployment
DiscriminationLaws
1. Zimmer Charts a Path Forward
The Zimmer vision for improving employment discrimination
law was laid out in his Georgia Law Review symposium article in
1996.59 At that time, as chronicled above, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
had been enacted, and it appeared that it might make changes in the
disparate treatment law that preceded it in which cases were analyzed
under either McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse, depending on
the type of evidence presented. However, as of 1996, the Supreme
Court had not provided much guidance on what changes, if any, were
wrought by the 1991 Act. Mike diagnosed the two most significant
impediments to a clear and uniform analysis in individual disparate
treatment law and, using two decisions of the Supreme Court in 1993,
charted a way forward that would impose order. Unfortunately, those
two most significant impediments persist to this day.
The first problem had fully manifested itself at that time. It was
that courts did not know how to determine which analysis, pretext or
mixed motives, to apply in any given disparate treatment case
because most cases actually involve presentation of circumstantial

57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
58. Based on Gross and Nassar, it would seem to be but-for. See Gentry v. E. W. Partners
Club Mgmt. Co., Inc., 816 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2016) (joining 6th and 7th circuits in applying butfor causation); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying
"but-for" causation to ADA claims in light of Gross); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.,
591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010) (same). But see Hoffman v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 597 Fed.
App'x 231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct 45 (2015); Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ.,
977 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Or. 2013).
59. Zimmer, supra note 5. Zimmer would further develop this vision and examine progress
by the courts in Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment
Discriminationand the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693 (2000).
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and direct evidence and implicate more than one motive on the part
of the employer for taking the adverse employment action.60 The
second problem had not been fully realized at that time, but it did
emerge in later years. It involved whether the amendments to Title
VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be interpreted to apply to
the ADEA and the ADA although the Act did not similarly amend
those laws.61
Mike considered the Supreme Court's two decisions in 1993,
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins62 and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,63
and found in them the seeds of a uniform analysis for individual
disparate treatment cases. The cases at least modified the McDonnell
Douglas pretext proof structure, and Mike wrote, they could be seen
to "foreshadow the complete restructuring of individual disparate
treatment discrimination law."' Although neither Biggins nor Hicks
applied the amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Mike saw in
them an anticipation of broad application of the two-step analysis that
the 1991 Act installed in Title VII: 1) plaintiff's prima facie case
proves motivating factor, resulting in imposition of liability;65 and 2)
defendant's partial defense - reduce the amount for which it is liable
by proving that it would have made the same decision for
nondiscriminatory reasons.66 Thus, Zimmer urged that what should
emerge is a single two-part analysis.67 Second, he argued that the
single analysis should be applied across the federal employment
discrimination laws despite the fact that the 1991 Act inserted the
two-part analysis into only Title VII.68 Mike asserted that, given the
need for a uniform structure in disparate treatment law, Congress
could not have intended otherwise.6 9 He also stated that the Supreme
Court had worked to develop a uniform structure for all of individual
disparate treatment law.o
Mike's Georgia article was a clarion call for establishing a single,
clear and uniform analysis or framework for all individual disparate
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Zimmer, supra note 5, at 583.
Id. at 621-25.
507 U.S. 604 (1993).
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Zimmer, supra note 5, at 570.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
Zimmer, supra note 5, at 621.
Id. at 621-25.
Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 622.
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treatment claims. I think Mike recommended precisely what the
Court and courts should do based on the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Sadly, at this time only one smaller part of that vision has been
advanced by the Supreme Court. As Mike predicted in the article, the
dividing line between individual disparate treatment cases - direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence - was eradicated by the Supreme
Court in 2003 in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.7 ' However, even that
small victory has proven ephemeral, as courts seem to have ignored
Desert Palace and continue to distinguish between individual
disparate treatment cases based on the type of evidence. 72 Moreover,
the two principal impediments to a clear and uniform disparate
treatment law remain. First, there is no single analysis that applies to
all claims, and the question persists whether any given case is to be
analyzed under McDonnell Douglas pretext or the statutory mixedmotives analysis.73 Second, the Supreme Court, which Mike in the
Georgia article credited for working to develop a uniform disparate
treatment law across statutes, worked in the opposite direction in
Gross and Nassar.4 As Mike argued, it seems fanciful to believe that
what Congress intended to do in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to
create a statutory analysis that applies to only Title VII.' The

Zimmer vision would have put employment discrimination law in a
far better place.
2. Examining the Evolving McDonnell Douglas Analysis with
Patience and Hope
Although Mike had charted a course forward that was not helped
by retention of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the Supreme Court
continued to work on that analysis. Mike examined the Court's
efforts in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 76 Although
many scholars were becomingly increasingly frustrated with the

71. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
72. See William R. Corbett, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.: McDonnell Douglas to the
Rescue?, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1683, 1691-92 (2015).
73. See, e.g., Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F. 3d 1227 (Ith Cir. 2016). The dilemma
even prompted a Fifth Circuit panel to craft a "modified McDonnell Douglas approach" that
fuses the pretext and mixed-motives analyses at stage three of the pretext analysis. Rachid v.
Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F. 3d 305, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2004).
74. See Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN STATE L. REV. 857, 857 (2010) ("The
Supreme Court has done a turn-about on the value of uniformity in employment discrimination
law.").
75. Zimmer, supra note 5, at 621-25.
76. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
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retention of the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, Mike patiently
and hopefully considered the Court's efforts in Reeves to strengthen
and preserve the pretext analysis in two articles." He concluded in the
article he wrote for my school's law review symposium issue as
follows: "If it is too early to know whether the full potential of Reeves
will be realized, it is also too early to give up hope.""
3. Finally, the Court Moves Toward the Zimmer Vision
I think Mike's most optimistic article was his 2004 piece in the
79
Emory Law Journal.
In that article, Mike considered the
implications of Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,o in which the Supreme
Court held that direct evidence is not required to support a mixedmotives jury instruction under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The
decision adopted an argument that Mike had made in his Georgia
article." The decision also seemed to clear away impediments for a
single disparate treatment analysis applicable to at least Title VII, if
not the ADEA and the ADA. Thus, Desert Palace appeared to
remove at least one of the two major impediments to the Zimmer
vision of a uniform individual disparate treatment law. Indeed, Mike
wrote that "Desert Palace may revolutionize individual disparate
treatment discrimination law."82 However, he also saw that lawyers,
being the creatures of habit that they are, might resist the abrogation
of an analysis with which they were so familiar. He wrote that defense
and plaintiff attorneys may "share the feeling that the known devil of
McDonnell Douglas is better than the unknown devil of section
703(m)." 8 3 His warning proved prescient.

Although Desert Palace did not say it was doing away with the
McDonnell Douglas analysis, it eliminated the line of demarcation
between pretext and mixed motives. Many of us predicted that Desert
Palace signaled the demise of McDonnell Douglas, and many of us
were wrong. The Supreme Court did not expressly abrogate the
77. Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual DisparateTreatment Law, 61 LA. L.
REV. 577 (2001) [hereinafter, Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing]; Michael J. Zimmer, Leading by
Example: An Holistic Approach to Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB.

POL'Y 177 (2001).
78.
79.

Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing, supra note 77, at 603.
Michael J. Zimmer, The New DiscriminationLaw: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither

McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004).
80. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
81. See text accompanying supra note 71.
82. Zimmer, supra note 79, at 1889.

83. Id. at 1942.
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pretext analysis, and judges and lawyers clung to it tenaciously as
Mike suspected they might. Thus, while most of us thought that
Desert Palace signaled a dramatic move toward the Zimmer vision of
disparate treatment law, we were wrong. The Court missed a singular
opportunity to go far enough in Desert Palaceto produce that result.
4. Working Hard to Save the Vision
As sweeping as his Georgia Law Review article had been in
laying out the vison of a clear and uniform individual disparate
treatment law, Mike's article in the University of Colorado Law
Review was perhaps his most creative, as he struggled with the
Court's decisions, to preserve hope for the vision.84 The article
examined the state of the law several years after Reeves and Desert
Palace were decided. Mike put forward three theses. First, the
"because of" standard of section 703(a)(1)" and the "motivating
factor" standard of section 703(m) 8 6 could be used at the parties'
choice for any individual disparate treatment claim.' Second, the
myth that all individual disparate treatment cases are either
McDonnell Douglas cases or Price Waterhouse cases never has been
correct." Third, the courts have recognized a variety of types of claims
under individual disparate treatment.89
It is amazing that Mike could remain optimistic about the state of
the law at the time he wrote the Colorado article. And yet, the third
thesis for which he argued, that there really are many recognizable
types of claims that cannot be correctly categorized under either of
the two analyses, may be the insight that someday leads to reform of
disparate treatment law. Some courts have become frustrated with
trying to fit evidence into the pretext framework and recognize that
the framework does not present the ultimate issue in a disparate
treatment case - whether the employer intentionally discriminated
based on a protected characteristic. 90

84. Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L.

REV. 1243 (2008).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
86. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
87. Zimmer, supra note 84, at 1247.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1247-48.
90. See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
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5. Frustration
Mike's more pessimistic articles on individual disparate
treatment law were the two he published in 2014, and yet in each he
concluded by suggesting a path forward to revitalize individual
disparate treatment law.
In his piece in the Nevada Law Journal'ssymposium on the 50th
anniversary of Title VII,91 Mike harshly critiqued the Court's decision
in Nassar in which the Court had held that the statutory mixedmotives analysis under section 703 was not applicable to Title VII
retaliation claims under section 704.2 The Court already had rejected
the chance for a uniform analysis of individual disparate treatment
claims across statues in Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, in which it
had held mixed motives inapplicable to the ADEA. 93 In Nassar, the
Court had rejected a uniform analysis even within Title VII. 9 4 Mike

explained that the Court's interpretation was at odds with the plain
meaning of the statutory language and the structure of the statute.95
In view of the Nassar decision and the movement so far from his
vision of a uniform analysis for disparate treatment law, Mike
concluded that realization of a broader vision may require
congressional action given the Court's predilection "to slice and dice
the law into insignificance." 96 At that point, Mike had reached
agreement with a pessimist (me) as to what was needed to fix
individual disparate treatment law. 97 But, Mike had worked with the
case law more patiently, constructively, and optimistically than I had
before calling on Congress.
In his 2014 article in the University of Chicago Legal Forum, 98
Mike explained how the Roberts Court has diluted employment
discrimination protections by both reducing the substantive
protections and increasing the procedural barriers to relief. 99
91. Michael J. Zimmer, Hiding the Statute in Plain View: University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar, 14 NEV. L.J. 705 (2014).
92. Id. at 705.
93. 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009).
94. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct 2517, 2525-33.
95. Zimmer, supra note 91, at 713.
96. Id. at 722.
97. Id. (citing William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Page from Parliament's
Playbook and Fix Employment Discrimination Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 142-43
(2013)).
98. Michael J. Zimmer, Title VII's Last Hurrah: Can Discrimination Be Plausibly Pled?,
2014 U. CHICAGO LEGAL F. 19.
99. Id. at 21.
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However, even within that broad context, Mike explained how it was
possible for Ricci v. DiStefano00 to be developed so as to expand
employment discrimination protection. In Ricci the Court had
suggested that intentional discrimination can be proven by showing
that the employer knew the racial consequences of its action. If the
Court were serious about that issue, Mike saw a way to carry that
forward to other cases (Ricci was a reverse race discrimination case)
and thus "make lemonade out of the Ricci lemon."' It would
establish a color-blind standard in which an employer's intent would
be established by showing that it was aware of the racial
consequences of its actions.1 Mike concluded, however, that based
on other decisions of the Roberts Court that contracted employment
discrimination protection through both procedure and substance,
general extension of the Ricci version of intentional discrimination
beyond the affirmative action/reverse discrimination context was
unlikely. 1 03
The article then explained how the Court has cut back on
employment discrimination protections substantively and by raising
procedural hurdles. Mike argued that plaintiffs should attempt to
counteract those restrictions by pleading and attempting to prove the
Ricci theory of intentional discrimination.'" If courts are not receptive
to that effort to extend Ricci, Mike suggested four other approaches
to reinvigorating employment discrimination law. First, the EEOC
could become more active in litigation.o Second, expand legal
services to plaintiffs without legal counsel who have meritorious
claims of small value.106 While the first two alternatives could be seen
as conservative measures that might be achieved without legislative
action, the next two are more drastic. Third, replace the presumption
of employment at will with a default rule of job security." Finally,
Mike proposed creating a new forum to decide labor and employment
disputes that would be largely independent of the judiciary.o
By 2014, Mike had seen the trajectory of the employment

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Zimmer, supra note 98, at 45.
Id. at 45-46.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 92-93.
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discrimination decisions, and he was realistic in his assessment of how
much the Court and courts had diminished the protections of the
employment discrimination laws. Still, he took what the Court gave
and tried to use it to mitigate the damage. But, importantly, he also
began to look for agents of change beyond the courts and for creation
of law beyond the scraps the Court was tossing out. He recognized
that his efforts to craft expansive discrimination law from the case law
were not yielding much of the lemonade he tried to squeeze out of
the lemons.
IV. KEEPING THE ZIMMER VISION ALIVE: COHERENCE AND
UNIFORMITY IN INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW

The Supreme Court's development of individual disparate
treatment law does not give much reason for optimism that a
coherent, even-handed, and uniform body of law is likely to be
developed by case law. Although Desert Palace presented a glimmer
of hope, the Court said too little to effect a significant change to
individual disparate treatment law. Gross created asymmetry of
analysis among the statutes, and Nassar created asymmetry within
Title VII. Thus, the last two decisions on proof structures and
causation standards for intentional discrimination, Gross and Nassar,
are antithetical to coherence and uniformity. Yet, there are promising
signs and reasons for hope. Mike would squeeze lemonade, and I
shall try.
A. Hope for Congress
Congress has not stepped in and significantly amended Title
VII1 09 or the ADEA since the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the 1991
amendments resulted in the Court's decisions in Desert Palace, Gross,
and Nassar."o On the other hand, Congress did demonstrate its
willingness to significantly amend legislation that is badly developed

109. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 is not the type of large-scale amendment that I am
suggesting. See Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. The Ledbetter Act did amend all employment
discrimination laws: Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2012); the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.§ 626(d)(3) (2012); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12117(a) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) (2012); and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (2012). However, its purpose was very limited - overturning the result in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2, 123 Stat.
at 5.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 35-55.
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by court decisions by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.
Still, what Congress does in most of its amendments of the
employment discrimination laws is insert language intended to
overturn specific Supreme Court decisions.112 What Congress should
do is embark upon an overhaul of the employment discrimination
laws informed by a review of the law by experts who know the
problems in the current law and who are aware of the possibilities for
reform.113 It is hard to be optimistic about the prospect for such
extensive legislative reform, but again I will channel Mike's spirit, and
remain hopeful.
B. Hope for State Legislaturesand Courts
Mike raised the possibility of replacing employment at will with a
form of job security.114 I must admit that I am not optimistic about
state legislatures replacing employment at will, given that forty-nine
of fifty states adhere to it."' Efforts to abrogate employment at will,
other than in Montana, have not met with success, including the
Model Employment Termination Act (META) promulgated by the
Uniform Law Commission. The META, promulgated in 1991, has not
been enacted by a single state. 1 16 Regardless of whether any states
generally abrogate employment at will, state legislatures and courts
do many things that could improve employment discrimination law.
Many states have enacted laws that extend employment
discrimination protections beyond those afforded by federal law.
State legislatures sometimes chart a course that Congress later
follows, as in the case of genetic information nondiscrimination laws.
More than thirty states enacted such laws1 . before Congress enacted
the

Genetic

Information

Nondiscrimination

Act

of

2008.11s

111. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
12101 -12213 (2012)).
112. See William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take a Pagefrom Parliament'sPlaybook
and Fix Employment DiscriminationLaw, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135, 136 (2013).
113. Id. at 143-44.
114. Zimmer, supra note 98, at 92.
115. Forty-nine states are characterized as employment-at-will states. The Montana
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987 removes that state from the list, although
weakly. MONT. CODE ANN. 39-2-901 to -914 (2014).
116. See MODEL EMP'T TERMINATION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1991), available at

<http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Employment`%20Termination/META final_91.pdf>.
117. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Genetic Privacy Laws, http://www.ncsl.
Org/IssuesResearch/Health/GeneticPrivacyLaws/tabid/14287/Default.aspx (last updated Mar.
2008).
118. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at scattered sections of 42, 29, and 26
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Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes
prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity.119 An additional three states have enacted
statutes prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation but not gender identity. 12 0 Several state legislatures have
enacted laws generally prohibiting discrimination based on credit
history, 1 21 as have local legislative bodies. 12 2
The ban-the-box
movement is further evidence that state and local legislative bodies
can be active experimenters in supplementing federal employment
discrimination law. Over 100 cities and counties and 24 states have
adopted "ban the box" laws, which generally stated, prohibit
employers from asking about arrests and criminal convictions on the
initial application and until some point later in the interview
123
process.
Such laws should have been a helpful adjunct to
employment discrimination law, addressing claims that otherwise
would present difficult disparate impact issues,1 but recent studies
indicate that the laws actually may decrease the probability of lowwage African American and Hispanic men being hired. 1 25 Although
the ban-the-box initiative ultimately may culminate in a finding that
such laws are not worth the unintended consequences, state and local
legislative bodies nonetheless took the initiative to try to address a
problem of discrimination.
State courts interpreting state employment discrimination laws
generally have looked to the federal courts' interpretations of the
federal statutes for guidance and adopted identical interpretations of

U.S.C.).
119. See https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map
(visited Nov. 4, 2016).
120. Id.
121. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Use of Credit Information in
Employment 2015 Legislation, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-andcommerce/use-of-credit- information-in-employment-2015-legislation.aspx.
122. See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Cook County Bars Bias Against Employees and Job
Applicants Based on Previous Credit History, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at A-8 (May 21,
2015).
123. See National Employment Law Project, at http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-thebox-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-local-guide/. Louisiana passed a ban-the-box law applicable to
state employers in 2016. La. R.S. 42:1701.
124. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in
Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, No. 915.002 (Apr. 25,
2012), availableat https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrestconviction.cfm.
125. See Alana Semuels, When Banning One Kind of Discrimination Results in Another,
THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2016), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016

/08/consequences-of-ban-the-box/494435/.
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parallel state laws.126 However, in an increasing number of cases, state
courts have adopted divergent interpretations of state statutes.1 27
Some of the divergent interpretations are attributable to differences
in the statutory language, but some are due to the state courts'
disagreement with the federal courts' interpretation. 128 For example,
some state courts have found the holding of Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc. 129 inapplicable to the causation standard under the state
age discrimination laws, principally because of differences in the
federal and state statutes.13
The state legislatures and courts are not constrained by federal
employment discrimination law on matters of state law, and
innovation and experimentation at the state level may help
reinvigorate federal law.
C. Hope for the Supreme Court
While the Supreme Court's individual disparate treatment
decisions have not moved appreciably in the direction of the Zimmer
vision of coherence and symmetry, I will be like Mike and look for
something positive in the recent cases. Two Supreme Court cases
from 2015 that addressed discrimination issues were generally
positive for plaintiffs and for expanding the protection of federal
employment discrimination law: Young v. United Parcel Service,
Inc.131 and EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 31 2
In Young, the Court reversed lower court decisions granting a
summary judgment against a plaintiff who sued her employer for not
granting her an accommodation of light-duty job reassignment during
her pregnancy, although the employer so accommodated employees
disabled in other ways.133 The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 34 requires employers to make
126. See generally Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .": Divergent
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV. 469,
477 (2006).
127. Id. at 473-74.
128. Id. at 484-85.
129. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
130. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Village of Breckenridge, No. 08-14559-BC, 2009 WL 3273255 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 9, 2009); West Va. American Water Co. v. Nagy, No. 101229, 2011 WL 8583425 (W.
Va. June 15, 2011).
131. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
132. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
133. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
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workplace accommodations for pregnant workers that it makes for
workers disabled in other ways that have a similar effect on inability
to work. 1 35 Although rejecting the plaintiff's proposed statutory
interpretation1 36 (as well as the defendant employer's argument that
the PDA does nothing more than clarify that pregnancy
discrimination is a type of sex discrimination), the Court went on to
hold that a pregnant employee could prove intentional discrimination
based on non-accommodation by using the McDonnell Douglas
analysis. 137 The majority described the analysis as proceeding in the
following way. First, the plaintiff would establish a prima facie case by
proving that she belongs to a protected class, she sought an
accommodation, and the employer denied the accommodation,
although it did accommodate others similarly able or unable to
work. 138 Next,
the employer
would give
a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for denying the accommodation, but that
reason normally could not be that accommodating pregnant women
was more expensive or less convenient. 139 Finally, the plaintiff would
prove the employer's reason was pretextual, and a jury question could
be created on this issue, by producing sufficient evidence that the
employer's policy actually imposes a significant burden on pregnant
women - a burden which cannot be justified by the given legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason and which permits an inference of
discrimination.14 0 Furthermore, the plaintiff can establish a genuine
issue of material fact regarding imposition of a significant burden at
stage three by presenting evidence that the employer accommodates a
large percentage of nonpregnant employees and fails to accommodate
a large percentage of pregnant employees. 141
I have criticized the Court for crafting a bizarre analysis based on
McDonnell Douglas, which I and others think the Court needs to lay
to rest.142 Nonetheless, I do recognize that the Court created an
analysis that saved the plaintiff's claim from summary judgment and
offered a way for plaintiffs in future pregnancy nonaccommodation
cases to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law.143
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349.
Id. at 1349-50.
Id. at 1353-54.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1354-55.
Corbett, supra note 72.
See, e.g., Legg v. Ulster County 820 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2016).
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In Abercrombie & Fitch, the Court reversed an appellate court
decision granting summary judgment for an employer on the EEOC's
claim that a job applicant was discriminatorily not hired and not
accommodated because she was a Muslim and wore a hijab to her
interview, which would not conform to the employer's workplace
dress code.144 The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not have
to prove, as part of her prima facie case, that an employer has
knowledge of her religion.145 What Title VII requires is that a plaintiff
prove that religion was a motivating factor for the employer's adverse
action. 14 6 The Court did not decide whether a plaintiff must at least
prove that an employer suspects a religious belief and practice in
order to establish motivating factor; rather, the Court said the
principle was arguable, but it was unnecessary to resolve the issue in
the case before it.147 The Court also rejected the idea that there is a
separate and distinct failure-to-accommodate-religion claim; instead,
a claim of that type must be a disparate treatment or disparate impact
claim. 148 The Court's reticence on the necessity of proving suspicion of
religion is unhelpful. More concerning is the Court's elimination of
the distinct failure-to-accommodate claim. The distinct claim
provided additional protection against discrimination based on
religion. However, overall the opinion must be considered favorable
to discrimination victims, as it permitted the EEOC to proceed with
its claim in the case and should help other plaintiffs claiming
discrimination based on religion survive summary judgment.
Young and Abercrombie & Fitch are favorable results for
plaintiffs and civil rights advocates regarding proof of discrimination
- substantive employment discrimination law.
In the two most recent terms, the Court also has rendered other
decisions of a more general procedural nature that are favorable to
more expansive discrimination protection. Mike expressed concern
about the procedural barriers being erected by the Court in his article
in the University of Chicago Legal Forum,149 so this recent movement
by the Court in the other direction is noteworthy. In Mach Mining v.

144. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031-32 (2015).
145. Id. at 2032.
146. Id. at 2032-33.
147. Id. at 2033 n.3.
148. Id. at 2032 ("These two proscriptions, often referred to as the 'disparate treatment' (or
'intentional discrimination') provision and the 'disparate impact' provision, are the only causes
of action under Title VII.").
149. See supra text accompanying notes 98-108.
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EEOC,1so while holding that employers could challenge the EEOC's
performance of its statutory duty to conciliate cases, the Court
announced a standard of review that is very favorable to the EEOC.
In Green v. Brennan, the Court held that a constructive discharge
claim does not accrue, and applicable filing periods do not commence,
until the employee gives notice of resignation rather than when the
last discriminatory act of the employer occurs.152
One more recent Supreme Court decision deserves attention.
Although it is a case under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state
153
wage law, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,
is the first favorable
decision for plaintiffs in an employment class action in some time.
The decision permits certification of a class and collective action
based on statistical or representative evidence (averaging of unpaid
donning and doffing time).154 The Court in Tyson Foods explained
and limited its rejection in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes... of what it
labeled "Trial by Formula." The Court clarified that the question of
admissibility when such evidence is offered in a class action is
whether it could have been relied upon to establish liability in
individual actions.156 The Court did not establish a broad rule
regarding the admissibility of representative evidence in class actions
but instead stated that the admissibility of statistical evidence
depends on the purpose for which it is offered and the elements of the
underlying cause of action."' While the repercussions of the decision
are difficult to forecast, the case can be seen as a sea change, with
Justice Kennedy, who was on the side of no class certification in many
recent opinions, writing the majority opinion in Tyson Foods.5
150. 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).
151. The Court described what the EEOC must do to satisfy its obligation. First, it must
inform the employer of the alleged discriminatory act and identify which employees have
suffered as a result, which the EEOC typically does in a "reasonable cause" letter. Id. at 165556. Then the EEOC must attempt to engage the employer in oral or written discussion to give
the employer an opportunity to remedy its allegedly discriminatory practice. Id. at 1656. The
"barebones" judicial review is limited to those requirements. An affidavit of the EEOC
asserting that it satisfied the obligations usually suffices to show satisfaction of the statutory
duty unless an employer provides credible evidence to the contrary by countervailing affidavit
or otherwise. If an employer provides such evidence, a court must conduct factfinding under the
narrow standard of review. If a court finds a violation by the EEOC, the remedy is to order the
EEOC to fulfill its duty. Id.
152. 136 S. Ct. 1769 (2016).
153. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
154. Id. at 1045-47.
155. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
156. Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1046-47.
157. Id. at 1046.
158. See Perry Cooper, Kennedy's Move Left on Class Actions Called "Watershed," Daily
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D. Hope for the Lower Federal Courts
The lower federal courts continue to struggle with the law of
individual disparate treatment, but there are reasons to be optimistic
about some of their efforts in this chaotic area. Of course, one or
more of those cases should eventually make its way up to the
Supreme Court. Consider, for example, the Eleventh Circuit's recent
15 9
effort in Quigg v. Thomas County School District.
The court
addressed the issue of whether the McDonnell Douglas pretext proof
structure is the appropriate one for analyzing at the summary
judgment stage a claim based on circumstantial evidence. The court
held that the two-stage mixed-motives analysis is appropriate, and
McDonnell Douglas is not because it is overly burdensome. 16 0 I think,
and Mike would think, the Quigg opinion makes a couple of
significant errors. First, it maintains a distinction between mixedmotives cases and single-motive cases. While that dichotomy is
supported by the case law, it is almost certainly an incorrect
characterization of employers' decision making. 16 1 Second, the
distinction between cases based on direct evidence and those based
on circumstantial evidence is an ethereal demarcation that should not
have survived Desert Palace.62 Yet, notwithstanding those missteps,
the Eleventh Circuit reached a good result of applying the statutory
mixed-motives analysis rather than the McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis to evaluate a case at summary judgment.
An even more promising recent decision is one by a Seventh
Circuit panel in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. 163 In that case, the
court reversed a summary judgment in a discrimination case in which
the district court had divided evidence between the direct and indirect
methods of proving discrimination and determined that the plaintiff
failed to create a "convincing mosaic of discrimination" under either
method. First the appellate court explained that the "convincing
mosaic" trope, articulated by the court in Troupe v. May Dept. Stores
Co., 1 64 was intended to be a metaphor for a court's consideration of

the evidence rather than a new test that had to be satisfied by

Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 68, at A-4 (Apr. 8, 2016).
159. 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016).
160. Id. at 1237.
161. See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 79, at 1923-28.
162. Id. at 1912-14.
163. 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016).
164. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
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plaintiffs.165 Instead, in the aftermath of Troupe, courts treated it as a
new test. The Ortiz court reiterated that "convincing mosaic" is not a
legal test and overruled a series of Seventh Circuit cases to the extent
that they relied on it as a legal test. 166 Next, the Ortiz court trained its
sights on the direct and indirect methods of proving discrimination
and declared that courts must cease from classifying evidence as
direct or indirect and treating such evidence as subject to distinct
approaches.167 The court stated that the legal standard is "simply
whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other
proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment
action. 168 "Evidence is evidence," the court declared, and should be
considered as a whole. 169 To that point in the opinion, the Seventh
Circuit panel had done some very fine work, doing what Mike
recommended and what we thought the Supreme Court already had
done in Desert Palace. However, next the court asserted that all that it
had said did not affect the McDonnell Douglas framework or "any
other burden-shifting framework, no matter what it is called as a
shorthand."o So, although the court professed to want a unified
analysis, it was unwilling to explain the relationship between the
pretext and mixed-motives proof structures, ending much as the
Supreme Court did in Desert Palace. However, the court did go on to
assess the evidence under the standard it stated - whether a
reasonable juror could infer that the employer took the adverse
action based on ethnicity, and under that standard, reversed the
summary judgment."' Although the Seventh Circuit panel flinched in
Ortiz, based on its reverence for McDonnell Douglas, rather than
solve the two-proof-structure conundrum, it produced one of the
most hopeful and promising decisions of a federal appellate court.172
Its rejection of the direct-indirect-evidence dichotomy and its focus
on the ultimate question of discrimination in assessing the evidence
on a summary judgment motion are encouraging signs. There is in the
court's opinion a clear desire to move to a single analysis.
165. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764.
166. Id. at 765.
167. Id. at 765-66.
168. Id. at 765.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 766.
171. Id.
172. Professor Bent also sees Ortiz as providing reason for optimism. See Bent, supra note
10, at 295-97.
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Even though the law of individual disparate treatment is largely
incoherent and chaotic and nothing like Mike's vision for what it can
and should be, Mike would find reasons to be optimistic and to
provide tools for the Court and courts to improve the law. In this
Part, I have tried to squeeze some lemonade. However, he also might
think now that the better approach, given the scope of the repair and
the Court's reluctance to undertake it, would be congressional
intervention.1

3

V. CONCLUSION

I miss Mike Zimmer as a person, a friend, a mentor, a co-author,
a teacher, and a scholar. I missed being able to send him a draft of
this article before submitting it. But I know that I am a far better
scholar, teacher, colleague, and person for having known Mike. I also
know that the law is far better because of Mike's contributions. The
vision he crafted for individual disparate treatment law was the law as
it should be. The courts and Congress have not moved the law there
yet. But Mike would continue working with what they gave him and
believing that it would get better. In honor of Mike, I am going to
keep that hope alive. And yes, Mike, once again, you are correct that
McDonnell Douglas is the gift that keeps giving. I am grateful that
you kept giving your gifts to the very end and that you continue to
give through your brilliant scholarship and your many colleagues and
friends who are influenced by you and your ideas.

173. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.

